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Abstract
In this paper a hierarchical extension of the Minority Game is defined and
studied. Numerical simulations show a special type of emergent global behavior
between separated parts of the hierarchical structure, connected only through a
normalized mean field quantity.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper a simple, single-level strategic game, namely the Minority Game (MG),
will be extended to form a hierarchical organization. The individual MGs will form a
group, and individual players within each MG will make decisions which depend on
the average behavior of their own and other MGs. Calculations show that under certain
conditions the elements of the individual MGs “know” much more about each other
than one would expect.
"...Hierarchical organization is a common way to structure a group of people, where
members chiefly communicate with their immediate superior and with their immediate
subordinates. Structuring organizations in this way is useful partly because it can re-
duce the communication overhead." [1].
One of the most interesting questions in the theory of hierarchical systems is how
much information a subsystem has about the performance of the whole. In addition to
study this problem the top-down influence of the "whole" system to the elements will
also be quantitatively studied.
2 HIERARCHICAL EXTENSION of MG
MG is a simple model of inductively rational systems [2]. This game is a system of
N interacting agents. Each agent brings a decision ai (si(t), µ(t)) between +1 and
1
−1 based on her si(t) strategy and the knowledge of the history of the game µ(t).
In all simulations each agent chooses from one of two stategies which are randomly
chosen for each agent in the beginning of the game. A strategy is a look-up table which
assigns the actual choice to the M component vector µ(t) of the previous M outcome
signs, sgn(A(t)). A(t) is defined as A(t) =
∑
i ai (si(t), µ(t)). Each agent chooses
the sth strategy from the possible ones with probability
Prob{si (t) = s} = Zie
ΓiUis(t) (1)
Where Z−1i =
∑
s′ e
ΓiUis′ (t), Γi is the inverse temperature, and the performance of
the ith agent’s sth strategy is evaluated by a cumulative score Uis(t). The updating
rule for the evaluation:
Uis (t+ 1) = Uis (t)− ai (si(t), µ(t))A(t) (2)
The second term represents the gain of the individual agents.
The original model is extended to form a hierarchical structure. This extension is
done in the following way. N ′ original MGs are connected into a new MG, where the
original MGs are the agents of this new game. In this hierarchical organization there
are N ′ (j = 1...N ′) original MGs, in each of which N (i = 1...N ) (low level) agents
play and where their decision is aij(sij(t), µj(t)). We use µj since each local MG’s
history contains the local and global minority sign hence it is different for every local
MG. For simplicity we will denote aij (si(t), µj(t)) by aij (t).
In each low level MG we have an outcome minority sign, −sgn(Aj). From the set
of these signs a global sum and a minority sign, is defined as A =
∑
j sgn(Aj) and
−sgn(A). Thus the score updating dynamics of the strategies are modified as:
Uijs(t+ 1) = Uijs(t)− aij(t)
(
Aj(t) + C
∑
k
sgn (Ak(t))
)
, (3)
The constant, C, expresses the ratio of the contribution of the local and global
environments. The local environment consists of the agents playing in the original MG,
while the global one is derived from the connection of the MGs. The game among the
MGs, however, differs from the original. The MGs, as individual agents, don’t have
strategies and memories explicitly. Instead the global connection between the MGs is
made only through their low level agents.
When C → 0 we obtain the original definition. It is often assumed in the theory
of hierarchical structures that the local interactions should be much stronger than the
global ones [3]. However, the violation of this assumption implies non-trivial results.
In the context of MG for values of C when the global interactions are stronger
than the local ones, the agents don’t choose a strategy to maximize their own winning
chance only, but also to help their whole group win against other groups.
To be able to analyze our extended multilevel model, we will decompose it into
three subsystems. Each subsystem contains binary interlayer interactions only, as
shown in Fig.(1). The characteristic quantities, namely the global efficiency and the
degree of symmetry, will be properly redefined.
2
Figure 1: Hierarchical organization of the minority games
3 RESULTS
3.1 Interactions between the elementary and intermediate levels
The new additive part of Eq.(3) is the same for every elementary participant, therefore
we expect that the normalized global “waste” σ2j /N averaged over the N ′ MG’s (de-
noted by < σ2j /N >N ′) will show the same characteristic pattern as in the original
game. A small value of the waste implis a high value of efficiency.
By this extension, however, the total payoff of the jth MG uj = −A2j−AjA might
be greater than zero, and thus it is no longer a "negative sum game".
Fig.(2) shows the results of the comparative studies between the original and the
special features of the extended game by calculating σ2j using the equation
σ2j ≡ 〈A
2
j 〉 =
Pem∑
µj=1
ρµj
〈(
N∑
i=1
−aij(t)A
µj
j (t)
)2〉
(4)
where Pem = 2M is the number of possible memory states, ρµj is the probability of
occurrence of the µth state in the jth MG. The 〈...〉 refers to the averaging over the
possible strategies and the overline stands for the averages over the memory states.
3
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Figure 2: < σ2j /N >N ′ as a function of αN = Pem/N for various N ′s, with C =
1/N ′ (left) and C = 1 (right).Γij ∼ ∞, Uijs(0) = 0, for ∀ i, j, s.
The left part of Fig. 2 refers to the case of C = 1/N ′ for various values of N ′.
Simulations show that the average of σ2j /N deviates from that obtained in the original
game, but the deviation does not depend on the value of N ′. In the right part of Fig.(2)
(C = 1), the average of σ2j /N differs not only from the original characteristics, but is
different for each value of N ′. It is easy to understand this dependence on N ′, because
the additive part in Eq.(3) does not implement any normalization. (The order of magni-
tude of the new additive factor is o(NN ′), while the original part of Eq.(3) is just o(N).
For larger values of our new additive part (which is proportional to N ′) and by the defi-
nition of MG we obtain larger values of σ2j /N than one would see in the original game.
A more striking result was obtained for the behavior of the symmetry between the
two minority signs. Fig.(3) plots the degree of asymmetry (θ2j ) as a function of αN
(left) and C (right), respectively. The asymmetry is defined by
θj =
√√√√ 1
Pem
Pem∑
µj=1
〈−sgn(Aj(t))|µj〉
2 (5)
where 〈−sgn(Aj(t))|µj〉 is the conditional probability of −sgn(Aj(t)) conditioned
on µj .
Our numerical results show that the system nowhere became symmetrical for the
two signs. Indeed in Fig.(3) we can see that for various Cs and N ′s we obtain the
same characteristics reflecting that there is no phase transition in the system with the
parameters we investigated. The tendency of the change occurs more slowly than in the
original game. The difference appears because our subsystems are not closed because
of the interaction between the MGs. Though there exists an ‘optimal strategy’ where
the symmetrical phase should appear, it’s efficiency is very low.
3.2 Interactions between the middle and upper levels
Our naive expectation is to find ’random players,’ i.e. players who select their strate-
gies randomly, because the choices of the middle level players are just the results of
minority games of the lower level. These ’choices’ cannot be interpreted as the results
4
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Figure 3: < θ2j >N ′ as a function of αN for variousN ′s (left) andCs (right). Γij ∼ ∞,
Uijs(0) = 0, for ∀ i, j, s.
of ’decisions’ because the middle level does not have any direct memories or strate-
gies. They are only mean field averages over the individual MGs. Although the lack of
memory implies the break down of the definition of the original scaled parameter, αN ,
we still found this quantity to be useful.
We define the waste σ2mu in terms of the variation in each of the middle level games
(mu is the symbolic notation of ”between middle and upper”). Explicitly, we have
σ2mu ≡ 〈A
2〉 =
N ′∑
j=1
Pem∑
µj=1
ρµj
〈
 N ′∑
j=1
−sgn
(
N∑
i=1
aij(t)A
µj
i (t)
)
A(t)


2〉
(6)
Note that the last term of Eq.(6) depends on N ′. The lack of normalization will not
have any effect, because we are only interested in the sign of the sum of the local
agents’ performance.
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Figure 4: σ2mu/N ′ as a function of α′N = P/N ′ for various N ′s, with C = 1/N ′ (left)
and C = 1 (right). Γij ∼ ∞, Uijs(0) = 0, for ∀ i, j, s.
The simulation results reflect the expectations discussed above. For those values of
C which implement larger local connections within an MG than to the global one (C =
5
1/N ′) the system shows random behavior (Fig.4 left). When the global connection gets
stronger, i.e. C = 1, the system shows an emergent coordination [4], i.e. the system as
a whole shows a different than random performance. Fig.(4) (right) shows positive and
not negative deviation from the random performance. This phenomenon is the result of
the interaction of the two minority games.
3.3 Interactions between the elementary and upper levels
In this case we could ask whether there is any direct connection between the elementary
and upper levels. Here we calculated different globally averaged functions σeu and θ2eu
(where eu the symbolic notation of ”between elementary and upper”). We define
σ2eu ≡ 〈A
2〉 =
Peu∑
µ=1
ρµ
〈
 N ′∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
aij(t)A
µ(t)


2〉
(7)
First, we note that there is now another scaled parameter. For Peu = (2
M
2 )N
′+1 pos-
sible states of the system the new scaled parameter is αN,N ′ = PeuNN ′ . And µ refers to
the state of the whole system (i.e. ρµ ∈⊗N ′j=1⊕Pemµj=1 ρµj ).
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Figure 5: σ2eu/(NN ′) as a function of αN,N ′ for various N ′s, with C = 1/N (left)
and C = 1 (right). Γij ∼ ∞, Uijs(0) = 0, for ∀ i, j.
In these numerical simulations (Fig.(5)) the results are qualitatively the same. (With-
out normalization the value of σ2eu/(NN ′) increases for greater values of N ′.)
Another interesting result of our investigation is the symmetry at this level. One
might believe that θ2eu would not depend on either N ′ or C, explicitly. However, the
simulation result (Fig.6) still shows some dependence on N ′ and C.
4 Discussion
We studied a hierarchical extension of the MG for three levels and studied the inter-
level interactions. First, the local MGs, i.e. the connections between the lower and
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Figure 6: θ2eu as a function of αN,N ′ for various values of N ′ (left) and C (right).
Γij ∼ ∞, Uijs(0) = 0, for ∀ i, j, s.
middle layers were studied. It was interesting to see that for the ratio C = 1 the global
efficiency depends on the number of individual MGs. By using this formula the indi-
vidual agents know the number of all MGs. In addition, at least in a broad region of
the parameters, the degree of symmetry is never zero. Consequently, in contrast to the
original game, there always exists an optimal strategy for winning the game.
Second, the connections between the intermediate and the upper levels were inves-
tigated. For the case of relatively strong local connections, the system seems to behave
randomly. For strong global coupling the behavior deviates from random behavior,
and shows a self-organized global behavior, which can be considered a special type of
’emergent coordination.’
Finally, the results of the study of the connections between the lower and the up-
per level also exhibits the property seen previously: for the case of C = 1 the global
efficiency depends on the number of games. In addition, the global efficiency shows
interesting dependences both on the values of the ratio number, and on the number of
games. In the future we intend to investigate these dependences analytically.
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